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SOPHIE MEUNIER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
The #rst plenary session started o" the 2010 CES conference with a provocative question: Do transatlantic relations still matter? This is a timely query as Europeans are questioning 
President Obama’s commitment to the transatlantic relationship and Americans are questioning 
the relevance of Europe in the 21st century.
On the European side, the election of Barack Obama did wonders to the image of the US, which 
had been tarnished after the end of the Cold War and especially under the presidency of George W. 
Bush. Quicker and cheaper than any public diplomacy program, the election of an internationally-
minded, highly educated African-American Democrat with a penchant for subtlety and compromise 
improved the favorable opinions of the U.S. abroad almost overnight, often by more than thirty 
percentage points in Western Europe. More than a year into his presidency, Obama still bene#ts 
from a prolonged honeymoon period in most of Europe, much more so than he does at home. Yet 
the same time, Western and Eastern European leaders feel they have been “neglected” by Obama. 
They deplore that Europe is no longer on the American radar screen. It is as if Europe was no longer 
the solution to the world’s problems, nor the source of the world’s problems, so why care? A series 
of public snubs and disappointments, such as Obama’s absence at the Berlin Wall celebration in 
November 2009, his skipping the US-EU summit in May 2010, and the failure of the Copenhagen 
climate conference in December 2009, are reinforcing many European policy-makers in their 
assessment and worry that Obama is indeed, sadly, a “post-European”.
On the American side, the importance of the transatlantic economic relationship is obvious, 
and so is the feeling that Americans and Europeans are part of the same political and economic 
family. However, the nagging European fear that Europe is no longer the source or the solution to 
the world’s problems seems con#rmed by American actions. In trade, the US has all but given up on 
a meaningful multilateral agreement and is instead focusing its e"orts on a multitude of bilateral 
deals in which Europe is not a party. In foreign policy, the US is concerned about appeasing its 
relations with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China, and the transatlantic relationship seems increasingly 
irrelevant to deal with these issues, especially as long as the Europeans cannot get their own house 
in order and speak with a single voice. 
So, do transatlantic relations still matter? Two of the panelists argued that they have lost 
relevance and don’t matter as much as they used to, while two argued that Europe is a major power 
to be reckoned with, making the transatlantic relationship more vital and vibrant than ever. 
 Peter Baldwin, Professor of History at UCLA and author of The Narcissism of Minor Di!erences: 
How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford University Press, 2009) asked whether transatlantic 
relations still matter to anyone else besides the transatlantic partners. Not really, he argued, and 
for other countries, the di"erences between Europe and the United States appear invisible and 
inconsequential, even though the processes by which they have achieved these similarities have 
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been di"erent. In four areas, however, Europe and America 
exhibit sharp contrasts and their powers of attraction over the 
rest of the world di"er accordingly. In the military arena, the EU 
is not much of a model to be emulated, since security is a global 
public good that has to be provided by someone ultimately. 
Similarly, with respect to knowledge development, whether it 
be genetically modi#ed organisms or Google for instance, the 
rest of the world is not following in European footsteps. When 
it comes to religion, Europe appears pretty unique in its post-
religious, though not post-Christian, secularity. By contrast, in 
the area of demography and immigration, the American model 
seems pretty unique and unlikely to be emulated. Nevertheless, 
these di"erences are small overall, and the rest of the world 
increasingly looks elsewhere to come up with their own model 
of economic development and social organization. 
For Je"rey Kopstein, Professor of Political Science and Director 
of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the 
University of Toronto, transatlantic relations still matter but not as 
much as they used to, in large part because of the inability and 
unwillingness of the EU and key European players to act or think 
strategically vis-à-vis the outside world. The world has changed, 
but the transatlantic partners have not fully 
adapted. The evolution of NATO is a case in 
point: nobody would invent it today if it did 
not already exist. It is not clear what purpose it 
ful#lls, what security dilemma it responds to, or 
how it surpasses other, competing international 
security fora. Whereas the Americans pushed 
hard for EU and NATO expansion, a policy that 
ran through both Bill Clinton’s and George 
W. Bush’s presidencies, this now appears to 
have been taken o" the table. Instead we 
now have the realist “reset” with Russia. The 
reset, undertaken in the hopes of eliciting 
cooperation on Iran, entailed the end of 
missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
the abandonment of the push to expand NATO to Ukraine and 
Georgia, some sort of deal not to make waves regarding Russian 
meddling in Kyrgyzstan, and an acquiescence in Europe’s tacit 
decision to suspend or slow down on EU enlargement to Turkey 
and other destinations on the new European periphery. This new 
American policy departure, it must be said, is having profound 
e"ects on the continent, some of them perhaps unintended. 
For one thing, the West Europeans have made their peace with 
Russia’s new assertiveness and have quietly suggested to the 
new EU members that they do the same. At the same time, elites 
of the new accession states and especially the elites of the new 
European and Eurasian periphery are paying an extraordinarily 
high price for the reset and, in the case of those outside of the EU, 
for their diminishing prospects of being admitted in the medium 
term. And so, while transatlantic security relations may not matter 
as much as to the traditional transatlantic allies, it remains true 
that their impact on those traditionally outside of the European 
alliance remains profound. 
Taking a contrarian view to these assessments about the 
withering signi#cance of the transatlantic relationship, François 
Delattre, Ambassador of France to Canada, argued by contrast 
that transatlantic relations have never been as important as today 
for meeting the challenges of globalization and a new strategic 
environment. When it comes to globalization, both pillars of the 
transatlantic relationship display a remarkable convergence of 
interests and objectives, mostly because their economies are 
so interdependent, being each other’s main economic partner. 
Whereas the media often focuses sensationally on the growing 
importance taken on by the Chinese economy, the fact is that 
today the European market is #ve times larger for the US than 
the Chinese market, and 56% of total American investments are 
currently in Europe. North America and Europe also share the 
same objectives when it comes to the downsides of globalization, 
such as preventing social dumping. This interdependence and the 
commonality of their social and economic interests lead Europe 
and the US to be crucial anchors of global economic governance, 
whether in the WTO or in the G20. The transatlantic relationship 
is also crucial for dealing with a changing strategic environment. 
In an “era of relative power”, in the words of French president 
Nicolas Sarkozy, where no single country is able to impose its 
vision by itself, Europe has become not only a major player but 
also a model and reference. Europeans have 
learned to cooperate and seek everyday 
solutions that take into account the interest 
of others. Therefore it is a natural pillar of 
the multipolar world, with North America as 
another crucial pillar sharing the same goals 
and aspirations. 
For Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of 
Politics and International A"airs and Director 
of the European Union Program at Princeton 
University, and Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution, transatlantic relations matter 
immensely because it is Europe, not China 
or India, which will be the second global 
superpower, both in military and civilian terms, for most of the 
21st century. This is already true today, though few people, 
including Europeans, realize it. Excessive pessimism about 
Europe’s decline stems in part from a tendency to focus on 
headline-grabbing problems, such as those that often dominate 
the US-China relationship, rather than stable and incremental 
cooperation, such as dominates the US-European relationship. 
But, more fundamentally, it stems from a basic theoretical 
misunderstanding by realists, who continue to hold 19th century 
views about the primacy of “hard” power population, aggregate 
national income, and military force in great power relations. 
Many scholars and statesmen would concede that most 21st 
century global problems can be managed only using “civilian” 
power, which rests on high per capita income, high technology, 
international institutions, a robust civil society, close alliances 
with in!uential actors, and attractive of social and political 
values. By this measure, Europe is the world’s second superpower. 
Yet when these same people assess the relative geopolitical 
standing of nations, they revert to 19th century categories: only 
big countries with big populations, large aggregate income, 
a single sovereign state, and massively manned military are 
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treated as superpowers. They fail to understand that active 
global power projection is increasingly a luxury good available 
only to those states with high per capita incomes—which is why 
China and India do so little of it. Even in the military area, Europe, 
with 21% of the world’s military spending, has 100,000 troops 
active in global combat situations, compared to China or India, 
with 4% and 3% of global military spending respectively, and 
a couple of thousand troops abroad each. Hence, the endless 
debates about institutionalizing, centralizing and strengthening 
of European foreign policy as preconditions for the exercise of 
Euro-power are beside the point: power does not need to be 
centralized to be usable in the networked world of the 21st 
century. The transatlantic relationship is more crucial than ever. 
One pillar, the US, provides the hard power (and is the “second 
superpower” on the civilian side) while the other pillar, Europe, 
specializes in the use of economic in!uence, international 
law, and power of attraction (while remaining the “second 
superpower” on the military side). None of this is likely to change 
for two or three generations. 
Whether Europe has been weakened by its successive 
di$culties, from the constitutional debate to the Greek crisis, or 
whether Europe does not get enough credit for being an actual 
superpower, what is indubitable is that it is in need of a new 
narrative in order to be taken seriously. Until then, transatlantic 
relations may not seem as attractive to the US as they used 
to be. Yet with the rise of new global and regional powers, it 
increasingly seems that Europe and the US are in the same boat 
when it comes to globalization. Maybe transatlantic relations do 
not seem to matter as much as they used to the rest of the world, 
as our panelists argued, but to Europeans and Americans, they 
seem to matter more than ever.
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